Guide

Security and limits

The library keeps data unreadable to a server that stores and reads it. It does not yet protect against a server that tampers. It has not been audited.

What it protects

Limits

An active server can read group data. Sealed messages are anonymous: anyone with a public key can seal to it, so openGroupKey can't tell who sealed a group key, and a server could seal a key it knows. Public keys aren't authenticated either: a server could hand out its own in place of a member's and receive the group key. Until signatures and key fingerprints arrive, the data is only safe from a server that stores and reads but doesn't tamper.
Linking trusts whoever shows the QR code. sealForLink sends the private key to the browser behind the code the phone scanned. If an attacker gets a user to scan theirs, they get the key. The app must ask the user to confirm on the phone.
No forward secrecy. Whoever gets a private key can open everything sealed to it.
No key rotation bookkeeping. The app records which group key version encrypted each row.
JavaScript can't wipe memory. Keys stay until garbage collection.
No post-quantum protection yet. A later version byte will mark a hybrid scheme.

These come from the Limits section of SPEC.md, which is the authoritative list.

Before you ship

Reporting a vulnerability

See SECURITY.md.